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Abstract
This thesis comprises two chapters. My first chapter studies the dynamic of the distribution
of wealth using a representative consumer theory with two sources of heterogeneity: taste
in public goods and initial wealth. I analyse how the wealthy and the poor change their
relative conditions during different economic cycles and apply the theory to a Ramsey
growth model to explore distributive predictions.
My second chapter studies the effect of state-owned enterprise, which is one of the most
important parts of the economy, on government corruption. I also include several controls
to enrich content and analysis. I hope my paper might contribute to the government’s efforts
to reduce poverty and fight corruption to make a better society.
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Introduction
The economy of China has taken off since reforming and opening its market in the year
1978. After more than thirty years, China has achieved remarkable success in regard not
only to the economy but also other aspects of society. However, several social issues have
emerged along with economy development. Two major issues that concern Chinese people
most are inequality and corruption.
China is believed to be one of the most unequal countries in the world in terms of in-
come. In 2012, the official Gini coefficient in China was 0.474. Since then, the government
has stopped reporting the Gini coefficient. According to a report from Peking University
in 2014, 1% of the most wealthy population controls one third of total wealth while one
fourth of the poorest families occupy less than 1% of total wealth.
China is also one of the most corrupt countries in the world, according to the 2017 Cor-
ruption Perceptions Index reported by Transparency International. The Corruption Rank in
China averaged 68.70 from 1995 until 2017, reaching an all time high of 100 in 2014 and
a record low of 40 in 1995.
Income inequality and corruption have been two of the most concerning social issues
of Chinese people. The government puts some effort into trying to solve problems. Xi
Jinping has led an anti-corruption campaign since he took office in 2012. The government
also came up with a policy to take targeted measures in poverty alleviation in 2014. Some
progress has been made, but much more work still needs to be done.
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This paper comprises two chapters. My first chapter studies the dynamic of the distri-
bution of wealth using a representative consumer theory with two sources of heterogeneity:
taste in public goods and initial wealth. I analyse how the wealthy and the poor change
their relative conditions during different economic cycles and apply the theory to a Ramsey
growth model to explore distributive predictions.
My second chapter studies the effect of state-owned enterprise, which is one of the most
important parts of the economy, on government corruption. I also include several controls
to enrich content and analysis. I hope my paper might contribute to the government’s efforts
to reduce poverty and fight corruption to make a better society.
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Chapter 1
A Representative Consumer Theory of
Distribution with Endogenous Labour
Supply
Wealth distribution is always a major concern for policy makers since it is directly related
to social equality and stabilization. Imbalanced distribution of wealth may cause serious
social problems such as increasing the crime rate and poverty within the population. For
example, according to the World Bank, 10.7 percent of the world’s population lives on
less than US$1.90 a day. It is also related to economic growth, “economics is concerned
with expanding the pie while politics is about distributing it” (Alesina and Rodick, 1994).
Therefore, it is crucial to analyse and understand how the distribution of wealth changes
over time so that policy makers are able to choose wisely to redistribute to make society
less unequal.
There are plenty of articles addressing this topic. Stiglitz (1969) isolates some eco-
nomic factors which in the long term tend to equalize wealth and some which tend to make
it less evenly distributed. He considers labour skills as the heterogeneity among individ-
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uals, which is one of the “forces for inequality”. He is the first to attempt to develop a
theory of distribution of wealth among individuals instead of among factors of production.
His work inspired many later economists, such as Chatterjee (1994). Chatterjee uses a neo-
classical growth model to investigate the behaviour of wealth distribution along dynamic
paths that converge to the steady state and results show that initial wealth influences the
future wealth inequality and the speed of distributional changes. Chatterjee’s work differs
from Stiglitz’s in one important aspect, since he assumes individuals and firms would make
rational choices. Becker and Tomes (1986) have also studied the evolution of income distri-
bution in a choice-theoretic framework. They use different kinds of luck among households
and examine a number of empirical studies for different countries, discovering that either
advantage or disadvantage of ancestors’ earnings is wiped out in three generations. Unlike
Chatterjee, they do not consider the influence of aggregate dynamics.
The importance of Stiglitz’s work is that he introduced heterogeneity among individu-
als since in real life everyone’s behaviour is different. However, it is impossible to track
every heterogeneous consumer’s distribution in a model; we need another way to study the
whole distribution. Therefore Caselli and Ventura (2000) introduce a representative con-
sumer (RC) theory. The definition of a representative consumer is “a fictional consumer
whose utility maximization problem when facing aggregate resource constraints generates
the economy’s aggregate demand function” (Caselli and Ventura, 2000). This assumption
is a crucial part of the whole representative consumer growth model since it does not reject
the heterogeneous behaviour of each agent in the model but only requires that potential
sources of consumer heterogeneity have sufficient structure to ensure that the sum of all
consumers behaves as if there were only one consumer. Under this assumption we are able
to restrict the behaviour of average quantities to depend exclusively on these same aver-
ages. It is also simpler to track these averages than following distribution function. The
12
RC properties are also held in Alesina and Rodick’s (1994) paper as they develop a het-
erogeneous agents model in which there is absence of policy choice, however they attempt
to characterize the link between income distribution and the choice of policies that affect
growth.
One important property of the RC theory is that it does not rule out heterogeneity.
There are many sources of heterogeneity, including the rates of time preference, tastes,
endowments, technology, initial wealth, progressive tax rate and so on. Turnovsky (2015)
thinks dispersion of asset endowments across agents is the most important source of het-
erogeneity. In this chapter, I will choose two sources of consumer heterogeneity: tastes and
initial wealth. The reason I choose initial wealth is that Chatterjee (1994) shows that initial
condition has a huge effect on the distribution of wealth. If an economy where wealth is
distributed more equally among individuals initially, it would have a more equal distribu-
tion of wealth in the future. It also influences the rapidity of distributional changes. Initial
wealth is always an important factor shaping the dynamic in the distribution of wealth. As
for tastes, individuals’ preferences in relation to public goods are a crucial factor to gener-
ate dynamic in the cross section of consumption. If there are no public goods, then there
will be no change in dynamic of relative consumptions, as we show in section 1.2. These
two heterogeneities ensure income mobility, in that individuals could improve or worsen
their relative position in the cross section part over a given period.
We can also apply the representative consumer assumption to the Ramsey growth model
to explore the application of RC theory. We see that the representative consumer theory
places few strains on the nature of observed distributions. In this chapter, except endoge-
nous variable consumption c and capital k, I also assume that labour supply l is endogenous.
However, it is complicated to study three-dimensional space (k, c, l) therefore I modify the
mathematical method (Benhabib and Farmer, 1994) to eliminate the variable l so that I can
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analyse only two variables and calculate their steady state. In section 1.4, we first calculate
the steady state, then we analyse the transitional dynamics around the steady state. The
result shows that even if we assume there is no government, i.e. no public goods, we can
still observe the dynamics around a steady state.
This chapter is an extension of work based on Caselli and Ventura (2000). I would
like to analyse if an agent in this economy could change their positions in the cross-section
of distribution of consumption, labour supply and wealth and how it would change. The
difference between my work and Caselli and Ventura’s is that I assume labour supply is an
endogenous variable instead of an exogenous variable. Labour supply is directly related
to labour income, therefore it would also be an important influence upon distribution of
wealth. By making labour supply endogenous, I can study how endogenous labour supply
would affect the distribution of wealth. It would be helpful to understand how distribution
of wealth changes over time so that we could address the problem of inequality more clearly
and directly. If we understand this, we could apply the mechanism to the situation in China
to help the government to improve inequality rooted in the society. The structure of this
chapter is that in the first part of this chapter, I set up the benchmark model and in the
following part I create the cross section of consumption, labour supply and wealth, and
show how the relative position of the consumer changes. In the last part, I apply my method
to the Ramsey growth model and observe the transitional dynamics.
1.1 Model Setup
Let us assume an economy with many infinitely lived agents indexed by j = 1, 2, 3, . . . , J.
In this economy, J is large enough that each individual’s choice would not affect the aggre-
gate quantities and prices. Every consumer has different taste in goods and they are also
different in term of initial wealth.
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Let c j(t) ∈ R denote individual j’s after-tax consumption on private goods and l j(t) ∈
(0, 1) denote individual j’s labour supply in terms of hours. Suppose that every individual
derives utility from consumption and leisure, therefore the utility function of the whole
economy is
U(c, l) =
∫ ∞
0
[
ln(c j + β jg) − ψ ln l j
]
e−ρt (1.1)
Note that the utility function matches the Gorman polar form which is a functional form
for indirect utility functions. It allows researchers to regard a society of utility-maximizers
as if it consisted of a single ’representative’ individual. Therefore, we can integrate each
individual’s utility function to form the utility function of the entire economy.
In equation (1.1), β j ∈ R+ represents different individuals’ tastes for the public goods
that the government provides, hence β jg can be interpreted as the value of the public goods
each consumer receives in terms of the private consumption goods. Note that in this model
each individual is no longer identical; the different taste in private and public goods is the
first term contributing to consumer heterogeneity. Naturally, if the value of β j is high, we
assume the consumer j prefers public goods more than private goods and vice versa.
Now we consider individuals’ wealth in this economy. Each consumer has a different
amount of initial assets and they receive return a on their ownership of the assets. They
also invest time into labour and receive a salary for their work. These are the two sources
of every agent’s income and heterogeneity. We define a j(t) ∈ R+ to be the stock of financial
assets of consumer j. Let r j(t) ∈ R+ and w j(t) ∈ R+ be the after-tax rate of return on financial
assets and the average after-tax wage rate for all consumers. We also define p ∈ (0, 1) to
be the ratio between after-tax private consumption and before-tax private consumption, i.e.
p(t) is equal to one minus the proportional consumption tax. With these definitions, now
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we can derive the individual’s flow budget constraint as
a˙ j = ra j + wl j − c jp (1.2)
On the left hand side of equation (1.2), a˙ j denotes the growth of individual j’s wealth. On
the right hand side, the first term ra j represents consumer j’s return on financial assets; the
second term wl j means individual j’s working income and the last term can be interpreted
as before-tax consumption. Hence the whole expression can be stated as the increase in
financial wealth equal to the excess of income over consumption. Finally, we impose the
restriction that no one in this economy can borrow new debt to pay the old debt, i.e. no
Ponzi schemes. Now in order to solve the consumer’s maximizing problem, we set up the
present value Hamiltonian as following
H(c, l) = e−ρt
[
ln(c j + β jg) − ψ ln l j
]
+ λ
(
ra j + wl j − c jp
)
(1.3)
Solving for the first order conditions, we obtain
∂H
∂c
=
e−ρt
c j + β jg
− λ
p
= 0 (1.4)
∂H
∂l
=
−ψe−ρt
l j
+ λw = 0 (1.5)
∂H
∂a
= λr = −λ˙ (1.6)
We also obtain the transversality condition as following:
lim
t→∞
[
e−ρtλ(t)a(t)
]
= 0
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In order to obtain the Euler equation, now we define δ as the growth rate of p and θ as the
growth rate of w. Then we have two different Euler equations for consumption and leisure,
which are
c˙ j = (δ − ρ + r)
(
c j + β jg
)
− β jg˙ (1.7)
l˙ j = (r − θ − ρ)l j (1.8)
We also obtain an intertemporal relationship between consumption and labour supply by
substituting λ in equation (1.4) into equation (1.5)
c j + β jg
l j
=
pw
ψ
(1.9)
Now I will check that optimal total consumption is a constant share of household wealth.
This is important because it makes aggregation possible so that I can study the dynamic of
the cross section of the main aggregated variable. As a preliminary step, we define
∫ t
0
r(s)ds ≡ R(t)
Using an integral factor, we integrate equation (1.2) and (1.7) to obtain
c j(0) + β jg(0) = ϕ
[
a j(0) +
∫ ∞
t
(
wl j +
β jg
p
)
e−R(τ)dτ
]
(1.10)
where
1
ϕ
=
∫ ∞
t
p−1e(δ−ρ)τdτ
The expression states that total consumption, including private and public goods, is equal
to a fraction ϕ of total wealth. Total wealth on the right hand side consists of three parts
which are initial assets a j(0), the net present value of wage income
∫ ∞
t
wl je−R(τ)dτ and the
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net present value of public goods the individual receives
∫ ∞
t
β jg
p e
−R(τ)dτ. We do the same
integration to equation (1.2) and (1.8), we obtain
l j(0) = σ
[∫ ∞
t
c j
p
e−R(τ)dτ − a j(0)
]
(1.11)
where
1
σ
=
∫ ∞
t
we(ρ+θ)τdτ
We can roughly interpret this expression as the initial wage income is a fraction of con-
sumption minus initial wealth. We can see that both ϕ and σ are independent of the char-
acteristics of the individuals, thus equation (1.10) and (1.11) are linear in a j and β j. This
property of consumption and labour supply function, combined with linearity of the flow
budget constraint, is essential to allow aggregation in this model.
Now we define an average consumer in this economy with the following characteristics:
a j = a, l j = l, βg = 1. With these definitions, we can rewrite the flow budget constraint,
total consumption function and leisure function for an average individual.
a˙ = ra + wl − c
p
(1.12)
c + g = ϕ
[
a +
∫ ∞
t
(
wl +
g
p
)
e−R(τ)dτ
]
(1.13)
l = σ
[∫ ∞
t
c
p
e−R(τ)dτ − a
]
(1.14)
1.2 Cross Section of Consumption and Labour Supply
We define cRj ≡ c jc and lRj ≡ l jl as the cross section of consumption and labour. In this part
we first deal with consumption and then we figure out leisure.
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Differentiating cRj with respect to time and substituting c˙ j with equation (1.7), we obtain
the law of motion as follows:
c˙Rj =
(
β j − cRj
)
∗ g
c
∗ [(r + δ − ρ) − x] (1.15)
We integrate equation (1.15), we get
cRj (t) = c
R
j (0)exp
[
−
∫ t
0
g
[
(r + δ − ρ) − x]
c
dτ
]
+ β j
[
1 − exp
[
−
∫ t
0
g
[
(r + δ − ρ) − x]
c
dτ
]]
(1.16)
Note that x is the growth rate of publicly provided goods. Both equation (1.15) and
its integral version (2.16) characterize the behaviour of the cross section of consumption.
It is stated as a function of average quantities, prices and the distribution of individuals’
tastes on public goods. As we can see from these two equations, public goods g generates
dynamic in the cross section of consumption. For instance, if we cancel out public goods,
i.e. g = 0, we obtain the result that c˙Rj = 0 or c
R
j (t) = c
R
j (0). Both results indicate that the
cross section of consumption does not change at all.
Firstly, for simplicity, we remove heterogeneity on public goods from the picture and
then we study under condition which individuals have different taste in public goods. We
control individuals’ tastes in public goods to only allow public goods to make the change
in order to better understand how the cross section of consumption interacts with public
goods. Therefore we let β = 1 for all the consumers in this economy. Now, whether the
individual’s consumption converges to the average consumption or diverges only depends
on low or high growth in the provision of public goods, i.e. the comparison of r+ δ− ρ and
x.
As we set each individual’s taste in public goods identical, every consumer now chooses
the same positive growth rate for their total consumption (c j + β jg), i.e. r + δ − ρ. This
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growth rate can be derived from equation (1.7) and it is a weighted average of the growth
rate of its two components which are private goods and public goods. Note that the growth
rate of public consumption is the same for all individuals. If the growth rate of public
consumption is low, then private consumption must be growing at a rate that exceeds that
of the total consumption in order to sustain the optimal consumption path. It depends
on the share of private consumption in total consumption. For example, if a consumer is
poor, he or she tends to consume a lower share of private goods, thus a higher growth rate
of private consumption is required to sustain the optimal consumption path. This is why
a poor consumer improves their relative position in the cross section when an economy
grows with low growth in the provision of public goods, i.e.r + δ − ρ > x.
Note that we defined δ as the growth rate of p previously, also p is the ratio of after-
tax private consumption and before-tax private consumption, so we can associate δ with
consumption tax. The relation between p and consumption tax is negative, thus when δ
is high, the consumption tax falls rapidly. In this case, total consumption grows quickly.
Since all consumers’ consumption of public goods grows at the same rate (x), the private
consumption of relatively poor individuals must grow especially fast in order to sustain the
optimal path.
Now with these two examples, we can conclude that whether or not an individual ex-
hibits a growth rate of consumption above the average or not depends on his or her share
of private consumption in total consumption. We reintroduce taste in public goods as het-
erogeneity (β , 1); a rich consumer who places a high value on public goods could still
have a low share of private consumption, while a poor individual could have a high share
if he or she does not highly value public goods. If two agents have the same ratio c j/β j,
they will have the same share. This means that if the economy expands with low growth
in the provision of public goods (r + δ − ρ > x), individuals with a low ratio c j/β j tend to
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improve their position in the cross section consumption and if the economy expands with
high growth in the provision of public goods (r + δ − ρ < x), individuals with a low ratio
c j/β j tend to worsen their position in the cross section consumption.
Differentiating lRj with respect to time and substituting l˙ j with equation (1.8), we obtain
the law of motion as follows:
l˙Rj = (r − ρ − θ)(1 − lRj ) (1.17)
We integrate equation (1.17), we get
lRj (t) = l
R
j (0)exp
[
−
∫ t
0
(r − ρ − θ) dτ
]
(1.18)
Both equation (1.17) and its integral version (1.18) characterize the behaviour of the
cross section of labour supply. We can easily see that if ρ + θ = r, then l˙Rj = 0 and
lRj (t) = l
R
j (0). Both results indicate that the cross section of labour supply does not change
at all.
Consumers obtain wealth from two parts: return on financial assets and wage income.
Individuals must earn enough to satisfy the optimal consumption path and wealth accumu-
lation path. For instance, if an agent is poor, he or she tends to possess less initial wealth
thus more time should be spent on working in order to sustain an optimal consumption
path. Note that θ is the growth rate of wage and r is the interest rate, if interest rate is high
enough that exceeds wage increase (r > ρ + θ), then individuals with high financial assets
tend to work less while poor individuals need to work more time to earn enough to sustain
optimal growth path thus they tend to worsen their position in the cross section of labour
supply.
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1.3 Cross Section of Wealth
We define aRj ≡ a ja as the cross section of wealth. Differentiating aRj with respect to time,
we have the law of motion:
a˙Rj =
w
a
(
l j − l ∗ aRj
)
− 1
ap
(
c j − c ∗ aRj
)
(1.19)
We combine equation (1.19) with equation (1.10) and (1.13), we get the final expression
for aRj as follows:
a˙Rj = Xl
(
l j − l ∗ aRj
)
+ Xβ
(
β j − aRj
)
(1.20)
where
Xl =
w
a
− ϕ
ap
∫ ∞
t
we−R(τ)dτ, Xβ =
g
ap
− ϕ
ap
∫ ∞
t
g
p
e−R(τ)dτ
If we normalize β to one, then we can interpret Xl as a function that captures the net
savings out of labour income (as a share of the average consumer’s financial assets since
it is divided by a) and Xβ also as a function that measures the net saving (as a share of the
average consumer’s financial assets as well) out of public goods. If we take the reverse of
these two functions, we can clearly see that both two functions state the difference between
the net present values of future wages and public goods and current wages and current
public consumption. Therefore, −Xl and −Xβ can be interpreted as how fast labour income
and public consumption grows.
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Now we integrate equation (1.20), so that we have their integral form like
aRj (t) = a
R
j (0)exp
[
−
∫ t
0
(
Xll + Xβ
)
dτ
]
+
l j
∫ t
0
Xlexp
[∫ t
τ
(
Xll + Xβ
)
ds
]
dτ+
β j
∫ t
0
Xβexp
[∫ t
τ
(
Xll + Xβ
)
ds
]
dτ
(1.21)
Both equation (1.20) and its integral version (1.21) characterize the behaviour of the
cross section of wealth. Take equation (1.21) for example, we can see that it is a function
of average quantities and prices and the distribution of the initial cross section of wealth
aRj (0) and individual j’s labour supply l j and taste in public goods β j. We can also see that
unlike the cross section of consumption, public goods is not the only generator of dynamics,
other variables also do so since even we can control g = 0, aRj (t) , a
R
j (0), i.e. there is still
dynamic existing in the cross section of wealth.
We write equation (1.20) as follows:
a˙Rj = Xll
(
lRj − aRj
)
+ Xβ
(
β j − aRj
)
(1.22)
If we assume in equation (1.22) that there is no cross-sectional variation in tastes, i.e. β j = 1
and all individuals work the same time, then we can analyse this situation similarly to the
cross section of consumption. In this economy, individuals first calculate their total wealth
(including stock of financial assets and the net present value of labour income and public
goods) then they choose the optimal path for total consumption. Due to the property of
homothetic preference, all consumers spend the same proportion of total wealth in each
date and thus they exhibit identical rates of accumulation of wealth. Note that the growth
rate of total wealth is a weighted average value of three parts: the growth rate of the stock
of financial assets and the net present value of labour income and public goods. We control
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the cross section of labour supply and set taste in public goods equal to one, hence the last
two components’ growth rate is identical for all agents. If this growth rate is low, then
consumers must accumulate their financial assets at a rate that exceeds that of the total
wealth. For those who are poor, the share of financial assets in total wealth must be low,
thus they require a high growth rate of financial assets to sustain the optimal consumption
path. Then, similar to the previous case, when Xll+Xβ > 0, poor consumers tend to improve
their relative position in the cross section of wealth.
Now return to the normal case, we do not control labour supply and β j which means the
share of net present value labour income will be higher if a consumer works more hours
and the share of net present value of public goods will be higher if an individual attaches
more value to public goods. Then the share of financial assets will be lower in total wealth,
therefore the growth rate of financial assets must be higher in order to sustain the optimal
consumption path. This is the reason that in an economy with low average growth in labour
income and public goods, consumers with low ratios a j/l j and aRj /β j tend to improve their
relative position in the cross section of wealth.
Now let us see how labour supply choices interact with consumption choices in shaping
the dynamic of the cross section of wealth. We rewrite equation (1.19) as follows:
a˙Rj =
wl
a
(
lRj − aRj
)
− c
ap
(
cRj − aRj
)
(1.23)
We integrate equation (1.23) and then we have
aRj (t) = a
R
j (0)exp
[
−
∫ t
0
(
wl
a
− c
ap
)
dτ
]
+
l j
∫ t
0
w
a
exp
[
−
∫ t
τ
(
wl
a
− c
ap
)
ds
]
dτ−
c j
∫ t
0
1
ap
exp
[
−
∫ t
τ
(
wl
a
− c
ap
)
ds
]
dτ
(1.24)
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We can interpret wl/a as the share of the labour income out of financial assets of the average
consumer and c/ap as the share of before-tax private consumption out of the financial
assets of the average consumer. Intuitively, equation (1.24) shows that initial wealth, labour
supply and consumption choice all contribute to shape the dynamic of the cross section of
wealth.
1.4 Ramsey Model
1.4.1 Steady State Analysis
To explore the application of representative consumer theory, now we turn to study the
distributive properties of the popular Ramsey growth model. We would find that the rep-
resentative consumer theory property places few restrictions on the nature of observed dis-
tributions, so that a wide range of distributive dynamics and income mobility patterns can
arise as the equilibrium outcome of the model, depending on different production functions.
We can use this property to obtain a more direct insight into the dynamic of distribution
of wealth in a representative model. In this part, we choose the Cobb-Douglas production
function as an example.
Let us assume a large amount of identical competitive firms indexed by i. Let k and l be
the average stock of capital and labour in the economy respectively and A be the technology
level. We assume the production function f (k, Al) is homogeneous in k and l and fits Inada
conditions.
For simplicity, we assume the government finances itself to provide public goods through
consumption tax, thus the revenue obtained from taxation is c(1 − p)/p. We define public
goods as an increasing function of contemporaneous revenue, i.e. g = g(c(1−p)/p), g′(c(1−
p)/p) ≥ 0. To simplify the calculation later, we suppose that this function is linear in private
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consumption c, i.e. g = 1−pp c.
We assume the firms take a Cobb–Douglas production function as
y = f (k, Al) = Akαlβ, α > 0, β > 0, α + β < 1 (1.25)
where k and l are average capital stock and labour supply. Therefore we get
rk = k ∗ fk(k, AL) = Aαkαlβ = αy (1.26)
wl = l ∗ fl(k, AL) = Aβkαlβ = βy (1.27)
As with Caselli and Ventura (2000), we assume that individuals’ preferences for public
goods are unified to one and the proportional consumption tax is constant, i.e δ = 0. We
define z ≡ c + g = c + 1−pp c = cp . Therefore we obtain c = pz. Then we have the relation
based on equation (1.7) and (1.9)
z
l
=
pw
ψ
⇒ z = pwl
ψ
⇒ l = zψ
pw
(1.28)
z˙
z
= r − ρ (1.29)
Note that a = k therefore we can rewrite equation (1.12) as
k˙ = rk + wl − c/p (1.30)
We divide equation (1.30) by k and we get
k˙
k
= r +
wl
k
− p−1 c
k
= α
y
k
+ β
y
k
− p−1 c
k
= (α + β)
y
k
− p−1 pz
k
(1.31)
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We rewrite equation (1.29) by substituting r in equation (1.26) to obtain
z˙
z
= α
y
k
− ρ (1.32)
Now we take a logarithmic transformation of equation (1.31) and (1.32) to obtain
dlogk/dt = (α + β)elogy/k − p−1elog(pz)/k (1.33)
dlogz/dt = αelogy/k − ρ (1.34)
In order to obtain an autonomous pair of differential equations, we need to rewrite y/k
in terms of k and c (Note that both z and g are functions of c since we assume p is constant).
We take a logarithmic transformation of the Cobb-Douglas production function (1.25) and
equation (1.28), and we get
logy = logA + αlogk + βlogl (1.35)
logl = logz + log
ψ
pw
(1.36)
We eliminate logl in both equations to obtain logy/k, and we get
logy/k = λ0 + λ1logl + λ2logz (1.37)
where
λ0 = logA + βlog
ψ
pw
, λ1 = α − 1 < 0, λ2 = β > 0
Therefore we obtain the dynamic system in (k, z) space, as follows:
dlogk/dt = (α + β)eλ0+λ1logk+λ2logz − p−1elog(pz)/k (1.38)
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dlogz/dt = αeλ0+λ1logk+λ2logz − ρ (1.39)
An equilibrium path (k, z) is the trajectory that solves equation (1.40) and (1.41) subject to
the initial condition k(0) = k0 and to the transversality condition. Now we turn to find the
steady state of equation (1.40) and (1.41). We let dlogk/dt = 0 and dlogz/dt = 0 then we
obtain two equations as follows:
(α + β)eλ0+λ1logk+λ2logz − p−1elog(pz)/k = 0, αeλ0+λ1logk+λ2logz − ρ = 0
We do some simple algebra calculation that yields
elogz
∗
= (α + β)
pρ
α
e−logpelogk
∗
(1.40)
e(λ1+λ2)logk
∗
=
ρ
α
[
(α + β)
pρ
α
]−λ2
e−(λ0−λ2logp) (1.41)
Clearly, pρ > 0, then we obtain the solutions for (k∗, z∗) are
logk∗ =
1
λ1 + λ2
[
log
ρ
α
− λ2log(α + β) pρ
α
− λ0 + λ2logp
]
(1.42)
logz∗ = log(α + β)
pρ
a
− logp + logk∗ (1.43)
Therefore, (logk∗, logz∗) is the steady state for the dynamic system in (k, z) space of equa-
tion (1.38) and (1.39).
1.4.2 Transitional Dynamic
Since we obtain two nonlinear ordinary differential equations (ODEs) of equation (1.38)
and (1.39), we construct the Jacobian matrix to linearize the system and calculate eigenval-
28
ues. Firstly we define
u(k, z) ≡ dlogk/dt = (α+β)eλ0+λ1logk+λ2logz−p−1elog(pz)/k, v(k, z) ≡ dlogz/dt = αeλ0+λ1logk+λ2logz−ρ
Then we obtain the Jacobian matrix as follows:
J(k, z) =

∂u
∂k
∂u
∂z
∂v
∂k
∂v
∂z

After some simple algebra calculation, we obtain
J(k, z) =
λ1(α + β)e
λ0+λ1logk+λ2(α+β)logz + p−1elog(pz)/k λ2(α + β)eλ0+λ1logk+λ2logz − p−1elog(pz)/k
αλ1eλ0+λ1logk+λ2logz αλ2eλ0+λ1logk+λ2logz

Now we evaluate the Jacobian matrix at the steady state, and we get
f (k∗, z∗) =
(λ1 + 1)(α + β)
ρ
a (λ2 − 1)(α + β)ρa
λ1ρ λ2ρ

Then the resulting linearised system is
dlogk/dt = (λ1 + 1)(α + β)
ρ
a
(logk − logk∗) + (λ2 − 1)(α + β)ρa (logz − logz
∗)
dlogz/dt = λ1ρ(logk − logk∗) + λ2ρ(logz − logz∗)
Then we can compute the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the steady state as following
trace = (λ1 + 1)(α + β)
ρ
a
+ λ2ρ (1.44)
29
det =
λ2(λ1 + 1)(α + β)ρ2
α
− λ1(λ2 − 1)(α + β)ρ
2
α
=
(λ1 + λ2)(α + β)ρ2
α
(1.45)
To check if det is always negative independently of the choice of the parameters, we sub-
stitute λ1 and λ2 into equation (1.47), and obtain
det =
(λ1 + λ2)(α + β)ρ2
α
= (α + β − 1)(α + β)ρ
2
α
Note that we assume a decreasing returns to scale production function, i.e. α + β < 1.
Clearly ρ
2
α
and α + β are positive while term α + β − 1 is always negative thus we have
a determinant which is always negative. Therefore, the equilibrium is unique. Now we
define µ as the eigenvalues, then we obtain the characteristic equation as
det(µI − J(k∗, z∗)) = det
µ 00 µ
 −
(λ1 + 1)(α + β)
ρ
α
(λ2 − 1)(α + β) ρα
λ1ρ λ2ρ
 = 0
Then we have an equation as follows:
[
µ − (λ1 + 1) (α + β)ρ
α
] [
µ − λ2ρ] − λ1ρ(α + β) ∗ (λ2 − 1) ρ
α
= 0
As detJ = µ1µ2, it will always be the case where one is positive and another is negative.
Therefore the steady state is always saddle path stable.
There are several differences between my model and regular Ramsey growth model.
First is that I introduce government presence and endogenous labour supply. I make total
consumption (z) equal to private consumption and public goods and adapt some mecha-
nisms from Benhabib and Farmer’s (1994) to express endogenous labour supply with total
consumption (z) to ensure the equilibrium in two dimensional space. Both factors would
differ the results in the steady state with regular Ramsey model. We will analyse how the
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dynamics change in the steady state in the following examples. Another difference is that
I construct Jacobian matrix to linearise ordinary differential equations (ODEs) to make it
more simple to analyse the equilibrium. There is one similarity that the equilibrium in both
my model and Ramsey growth model is saddle path stable.
Now we take two examples to analyse the dynamic around the steady state. First, we
assume there is no government in this model, i.e. p = 1. We evaluate α = β = 13 , ρ =
1
2 ,
then we can calculate the steady state as follows
f (k∗, z∗) =

1
3 −23
−13 16

Therefore the characteristic equation is
µ2 − 1
2
µ − 1
6
= 0
After calculation we obtain the two eigenvalues
µ1 =
√
3 +
√
11
4
√
3
> 0, µ2 =
√
3 − √11
4
√
3
< 0
In figure 1.1, two red lines are k˙ = 0 and z˙ = 0 respectively and the black line is
animated trajectory of the solution path. We see from figure 1.1 that if the economy travels
along the stable arm, consumption z would always converge to the steady state since it is
saddle path stability. The black line shows one example that the economy starts from initial
point that exceeds the steady state, we can see that z declines at first then increases.
Note that we assume there is no government in this example, i.e. p = 0. We already
know there are no dynamics in the cross section of consumption, however, we can still
observe dynamics in the cross section of wealth as it is shown in the figure 1.1.
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Figure 1.1: Cobb-Douglas production function without government
Now we take an example with the government presence, i.e. p , 1. We evaluate
α = 12 , β =
1
4 , ρ =
1
3 , p =
1
2 , then we can calculate the steady state as follows
f (k∗, z∗) =

1
4 −38
−16 112

Therefore the characteristic equation is
µ2 − 1
3
µ − 1
24
= 0
After calculation we obtain the two eigenvalues
µ1 =
√
2 +
√
5
6
√
2
> 0, µ2 =
√
2 − √5
6
√
2
< 0
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Figure 1.2: Cobb-Douglas production function with government
Figure 1.2 shows the results around the steady state with the government presence. two
red lines are k˙ = 0 and z˙ = 0 respectively and the black line is animated trajectory of the
solution path. It is still a saddle path stability thus if the economy travels along the stable
arm, consumption z would always converge to the steady state. The black line shows one
example that the economy starts from initial point that is below the steady state, we can see
that z increases at the beginning then it declines.
1.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have analysed the influence of introducing two sources of heterogeneity
in the RC growth model and studied the dynamics in the cross section of consumption,
labour supply and wealth. In the cross section of consumption, we draw the conclusion
that two consumers would have the same share of public goods in total consumption if and
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only if they have the same ratio c j/β j. Consumers with a low ratio c j/β j tend to improve
their position in the cross section of consumption if r + δ − ρ > x. In the cross section
of labour supply, we conclude that if the interest rate is high, rich people tend to work
less while poor people need to work more to sustain optimal growth path. In the cross
section of wealth, we observe that if the growth rate in wages and public goods is low,
individuals possessing more initial wealth tend to improve their relative position while the
working class tend to worsen. The observations would help policy makers to make to be
more helpful to address inequality.
We also apply the RC assumptions to the Ramsey growth model and use the Cobb-
Douglas production function. We find that the RC property places few restraints on the
dynamics of observed distributions, we set up with two examples to show how dynamic
changes around steady state. Another important finding is that even if there are no public
goods in the model, we are still able to observe the dynamics around the steady state in the
cross section of wealth.
1.6 Appendix
1.6.1 Euler Equation
Let us show how we get the Euler equation for consumption and labour supply. Let equa-
tion (1.4) equal to zero and rewrite it, so that we get
p ∗ e−ρt
c j + β jg
= λ
Then we take a logarithm on both sides and we have
logp − ρt − log
(
c j + β jg
)
= logλ
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We take a derivative with respect to time, and obtain
p˙
p
− ρ − c˙ j + β jg˙
c j + β jg
=
λ˙
λ
= −r
We arrange this to get the Euler equation for consumption as equation (1.7). The same
procedure applies to the Euler equation for labour supply, i.e. equation (1.8).
1.6.2 Integral
We rewrite equation (1.2) as follows:
a˙ j − ra j = wl j − c jp
We Multiply both sides with integral factor, and get
a˙ jexp
(
−
∫ t
0
r (s) ds
)
−ra jexp
(
−
∫ t
0
r (s) ds
)
= wl jexp
(
−
∫ t
0
r (s) ds
)
−c j
p
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
r (s) ds
)
Then the LHS can be regarded as differentiating a j with respect to time, so that we obtain
d
dt
[
a jexp
(
−
∫ t
0
r (s) ds
)]
= exp
(
−
∫ t
0
r (s) ds
) (
wl j − c jp
)
We take integration on both sides from time zero to time T
a jexp
(
−
∫ t
0
r (s) ds
) ∣∣∣∣∣T
0
=
∫ T
0
[(
wl j − c jp
)
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
r (s) ds
)]
dτ
After some algebra, we have
a j (T ) exp
(
−
∫ T
0
r (T ) dT
)
−a j (0) =
∫ T
0
[
wl j (t) exp
(
−
∫ t
0
r (s) ds
)]
dτ−
∫ T
0
[
c j (t)
p
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
r (s) ds
)]
dτ
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We take the limit as T → ∞ and note that we rule out a Ponzi scheme, we obtain
∫ ∞
0
[
c j (t)
p
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
r (s) ds
)]
dτ = a j (0) +
∫ ∞
0
[
wl j (t) exp
(
−
∫ t
0
r (s) ds
)]
dτ
Now we rewrite equation (1.7)
c˙ j + β jg˙
c j + β jg
= δ − ρ + r
Let X (t) = c j + β jg then we get
˙X (t)
X (t)
= δ − ρ + r
This can be regarded as
d
dt
[
logX (t)
]
= δ − ρ + r
We integrate both sides from time zero to time t, so that we have
X (t) = X (0) exp
[∫ t
0
(r (t) + δ − ρ) ds
]
Therefore, we have
c j (t) =
[
c j (0) + β jg (0)
]
exp
[∫ t
0
(r (t) + δ − ρ) ds
]
− β jg (t)
We substitute this into the previous equation and with some rearranging; we obtain the final
integral version, i.e. equation (1.10).
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1.6.3 Differential
We derive cRj with respect to time, so that we obtain
c˙Rj =
c˙ j
c
− c jc˙
c2
We combine this equation with equation (1.7) and its derivation equation of c, so that we
can obtain equation (1.15) in the end. The same procedure applies to equation (1.19).
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Chapter 2
The Role of State-owned Enterprises on
Corruption in China
Corruption has always been a major social problem haunting both developed and develop-
ing countries around the world. According to the definition of the World Bank, corruption
means “the offering, giving, receiving or soliciting, directly or indirectly, anything of value
to influence improperly the actions of another party”. Corruption includes acts of bribery,
embezzlement, nepotism and state capture. Although it is difficult to estimate the precise
cost of corruption, a report accomplished in 2012 by World Economic Forum shows this
cost to equals more than 5% of global GDP (US dollar 2.6 trillion)1. The overall economic
and social costs of corruption are likely to be even larger compared to the said data. It is
only rational to fight corruption in order to make government and society more transparency
and efficient.
The economy of China has taken off since Deng Xiaoping’s reforming and opening
market policy, and it has achieved remarkable goals in the last 40 years. China has be-
1The report is shown in this website:
http://reports.weforum.org/global-agenda-council-2012/councils/anti-corruption/
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come the second largest economy and the largest developing country in the world and it
still remains above the average growth rate. However, corruption is becoming more and
more intense as the economy develops and China is one of the countries that suffers most
from corruption around the world. According to the Transparency International Corruption
Perceptions Index 20162 , China was the 79 least corrupt nation out of 175 countries. This
is a progress compared to 2014 (100th) and 2015 (83th) but still far from satisfactory. The
Asian Barometer Survey3 conducted a survey in mainland China in 2002 including one
question: Corruption in politics and government is under control - is better than before?
28% of interviewees chose the answer “somewhat worse”, nearly half (46.3%) answered
“much worse”. This survey shows a trending public opinion in China, i.e. that corruption
is much worse since reforming and opening market in 1978. This opinion is particularly
popular among senior citizens. They tend to blame Deng Xiaoping’s policy for the corrup-
tion. Whether this is true or false, people feel dissatisfied about corruption in government
in spite of the speeding economic growth.
There are severe consequences resulting from corruption. The first is that corruption is
bad for economic growth. This is almost a consensus among economists, and China is no
exception. Speeding economic growth in the past three decades has depended largely on de-
mographic dividend and foreign capital. Wang and Mason (2004) argue that demographic
dividend contributes 15% to economic growth between 1982 and 2000. With demographic
dividend fading away and foreign capital withdrawing investment, the Chinese economy
has been in turmoil in the past few years and corruption has re-emerged. Mauro (1995)
argues that corruption hurts economic growth by lowering investment. This is consistent
with the current situation in China. Private investment has been decreasing in these years
2The index is shown in the website:
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption perceptions index 2016
3The survey can be found in this website:
http://www.jdsurvey.net/jds/jdsurveyAnalisis.jsp?ES COL=101&Idioma=I&SeccionCol=04&ESID=447
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and hit a record low in 2015. Taking north east China (Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning) for
example, these three provinces’ governments are notorious for their corruption and black-
box operation. The North East is also filled with state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The
SOEs compete unfairly with private companies taking advantage of their connection with
the government. There is a saying, “Do not invest beyond Shanhaiguan”, which means do
not invest in North East China. Private investment dropped dramatically in the North East
by 27.5% in the first quarter of 2017. The numbers are 9.5% and 26% in 2015 and 2016
respectively. The GDP growth rate is relatively low in North East China compared to other
areas.
The second disadvantage is that corruption hurts the image of government, resulting
in citizens losing faith in the government. Although polls show that Chinese citizens are
more satisfied with the government than western countries, this is far from the whole truth.
The Chinese government controls speech and press tightly, therefore the media tends to
report positive news of the government instead of criticizing. In the less controlled internet,
people are more likely to complain about corruption and discredit the government. When
the government denies rumours, people tend to believe rumours instead of the government.
The government is consequently losing its credibility. Roman historian Tacitus said once
“and now that the emperor was once hated, his good and evil deeds alike brought him
unpopularity”. The government seems to be the “hated emperor” and this is a vicious
circle.
Corruption also harms social justice and welfare. For example, state-owned enterprises
could take advantage of monopoly benefits to provide their employees with products at a
lower price than average citizens and pass on the high production cost to the whole society.
This happens quite often among monopoly state-owned enterprises.
Therefore, Xi Jinping has been fighting corruption harder under his administration and
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some progress has been made. He is leading an anti-corruption campaign in China and it
has been gaining prominence in recent years. Dozens of high-ranked officials have been
arrested and convicted. However, more work needs to be done. The government system
still remains unchanged and the legal system has not improved substantially. Depending
on the rule of man instead of the rule of law is considered to be temporary, thus corruption
is still a severe social problem in China.
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) play a special role in the Chinese economy and con-
tribute substantially to the economic take-off. However, public opinion tends to think
that state-owned enterprises induce corruption and argues that the most corrupted areas
are those depending more deeply on state-owned enterprises. A research4 conducted in
2012 by The People’s Forum shows that 61.9% interviewees express negative feelings to-
wards state-owned enterprises mainly because they are concerned about the corruption and
monopoly of state-owned enterprises. This chapter provides empirical evidence on the role
of state-owned enterprises on corruption in mainland China. I use the share of SOE em-
ployees as a percentage of total workers in each province over 1998-2016 as an indicator
of the prominence of state-owned enterprises.
There are papers addressing the relationship between corruption and economic growth.
Mauro (1995) has analysed a data set drawn from Business International (BI) of subjective
indices of corruption, the amount of red tape, the efficiency of the judicial system and var-
ious categories of political stability for a cross section of countries. He found that corrup-
tion lowers private investment, thereby reducing economic growth even in those countries
where bureaucratic regulations are very cumbersome. This result fits into the mainstream
view of corruption and economic growth: corruption may have a negative effect on eco-
nomic growth. Mo (2001) also introduces a new perspective on the role of corruption in
4The research can be found in the website:
http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/82288/112848/112851/18017456.html
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economic growth and provides quantitative estimates of the impact of corruption on the
growth and importance of the transmission channels. He found that corruption affects eco-
nomic growth mostly (53%) through political instability; it also reduces the level of human
capital and the share of private investment.
However, there are a few authors who suggest that corruption may raise economic
growth, like Leff (1964) and Huntington (1968). In a recent paper, Huang (2016) col-
lected data from thirteen Asia-Pacific countries over the 1997-2013 period and found that
there is a significant positive causality running from corruption to economic growth in
South Korea, an opposite significant positive causality in China, and no significant causal-
ity in other countries. He suggested that the “grease the wheels” hypothesis, suggesting
that corruption helps the economy to run smoothly, seems to work in South Korea, and that
most anti-corruption campaigns in Asia-Pacific countries do not improve their economic
development.
A related literature analyses the determinants of corruption. Rijckeghem and Weder
(1997) found that low wages may cause corruption. They developed two efficiency wage
models and found that civil service wages are an important determinant of corruption in
both a fair wage model and shirking model, while empirical evidence shows a negative
relationship between corruption and wages across developing countries. Fan et al. (2009)
argues that the more complex the structures of the government is, the more dangerous is
the uncoordinated rent-seeking. Treisman (2000) finds five arguments that may reduce cor-
ruption: Protestant traditions; a more developed economy and higher quality government;
a history of British rule; unitary government; a long period of exposure to democracy and
openness to trade. Goel and Nelson (2010) analyse a wide set of historical, geographical
and government determinants of corruption and find that both the size and scope of gov-
ernment matter and that historical inertia induces corruption to persist, while geographic
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factors can mitigate corruption. Paldam (2002) finds that the economic transition from
poor to rich strongly decreases corruption, while high inflation increases corruption. Zhan
(2017) uses a sub-national approach from China to find that resource dependence increases
the propensity for corruption by state employees. Zhu and Wu (2014) find that mining,
real estate and agriculture are the three most corrupt sectors in China. Following these
literature, I include foreign direct investment (FDI) per capita across every province over
1998-2015, denoting foreign capital stock and province-level data of the number of civil
servants over 1998-2015, denoting structure of government in my empirical model. I also
add two dummy variables: 1) former dominated area of western powers at the end of the
Qing dynasty; 2) coastal areas denoting historical and geographical factors respectively. I
also use provincial GDP per capita as a control variable to eliminate economic development
differences among different provinces.
Other than these observable variables, the so-called “cultural dross” is also an impor-
tant variable influencing corruption, although it is unobserved and difficult to be quantified,
so I can only explain its effect intuitively. China has a history of thousands of years and
it has developed a huge cultural inertia. Chinese culture is influenced deeply by Confu-
cianism. Some parts of Chinese culture advocate that power is everything and one should
gain maximum benefit via any possible means. Although businessmen have been rich since
ancient times, their social status is the lowest. There are plenty of examples of business-
men being killed for offending the government in the history of China, such as the famous
Ming dynasty businessman Shen Wansan and the Qing dynasty “red top official merchant”
Hu Xueyan. The former was sentenced to death because his property was coveted by the
emperor; the latter died in poverty for political reasons. Even in modern society, some
government officials still frame businessmen in order to possess their property or oppress
them. This is an important reason why Chinese businessmen, either ancient or modern,
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are more willing to bribe government officials and Chinese people are more accustomed
to bribe-giving and bribe-taking. They want not only interest, but also shelter. This kind
of “cultural dross” has become deeply ingrained within Chinese citizens’ minds over thou-
sands of year. It will take generations of education to remove it. It is very difficult to
quantify this kind of variable, so in this chapter we do not discuss it.
To understand what might affect corruption will help the government to suit the remedy
to the case and decrease corruption. This chapter will proceed as follows: section 2.1
describes the data I use; section 2.2 describes the model I adopt and my expectations;
section 2.3 statistically tests the effects of the mentioned arguments on corruption, discusses
the findings and provides plausible explanations; section 2.4 concludes.
2.1 Data
2.1.1 Measurement of Corruption
China provides an ideal case to explore the role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on cor-
ruption because of its outstanding economic achievement and notoriously corrupt govern-
ment. In spite of the underlying political stories behind the scenes, like undermining po-
litical opponents and witch hunting, dozens of high ranking officials including military
officers have been arrested for corruption since the anti-corruption campaign led by Xi Jin-
ping. I start this section by providing a legal definition (the 1997 version) of corruption
in the context of China. In China, corruption by state employees is called zhi wu fan zui
and the law states that corruption consists of embezzlement (tan wu), bribery (hui lu), mis-
appropriation (nuo yong gong kuan), collective embezzlement (ji ti si fen), holding huge
property with unidentified sources (ju’e cai chan lai yuan bu ming), abuse of authority (lan
yong zhi quan), dereliction of duty (wan hu zhi shou) and fraud (xun si wu bi). According
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to the Procuratorial Yearbook of China, embezzlement and bribery are by far the largest
two categories since 1998.
There are different measurements of corruption. Li (2016) provides three types of mea-
surement: perception-based measures, demand-side measures and supply-side measures. I
use the data of numbers of annul prosecuted corruption cases. This is a demand-side mea-
sure focusing on an objective indicator. The Procuratorial Yearbook of China published by
the Supreme People’s Procuratorate records the number of annul registered cases of cor-
ruption committed by public officials in the procurator’s office in each province. I collect
the number of cases from 1998 to 2016, since the Criminal Law changed the definition of
corruption in 1997 as the dependent variable. The advantage of this dataset is that it is
objective and unbiased compared to perception-based measures which are more subjective
and easily influenced by the press and other individuals’ opinions. My dependent variable
Corr, denoting corruption, is the number of corruption cases per million people.
2.1.2 State-owned Enterprises (SOE)
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate the the contribution of state-owned firms to employment.
Note that some provinces are empty due to data being unavailable. We can clearly see
that since the year of the return of Hong Kong (1997), the employment of state-owned
enterprises keep decreasing in every province in mainland China. This trend reflects the
development of the Chinese economy, insofar as the public economy used to contribute
most to employment in China, but private firms now consist of most employment.
The public-owned economy is a crucial and fundamental part of the Chinese economy,
since the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China states the dominant role of the
public-owned economy. The direct reflection of the public-owned economy is state-owned
enterprise. According to the China Statistical Yearbook, in 2011, the share of state-owned
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Figure 2.1: State-owned enterprises’ share of employment part 1
and state-holding enterprises in gross industrial output was 26.2%, which is a decrease
compared to 68.8% in 1998. The employment share of state-owned and state-holding en-
terprises also dropped from 60.5% in 1998 to 19.8% in 2011. The World Bank and State
Department of China forecast that this trend is going to continue and the share of state-
owned and state-holding enterprises in gross industrial output will fall to approximately
10% by 2030. However, Xi Jingping has stated that China should develop more state-owned
enterprise. Under his administration, the profits of state-owned enterprises have grown fast.
A financial report has stated that in 2014, the profit of the four biggest state-owned banks
was above 30 billion USD in average and the average profit of the 12 largest state-owned
enterprises was more than 10 billion USD. In 2017, the profit of 98 state-owned enterprises
gained more than 1.4 trillion RMB, increased 15.2% on a year-on-year basis according to
the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). This is a
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Figure 2.2: State-owned enterprises’ share of employment part 2
remarkable achievement in the relatively depressed economy of China.
The aim of state-owned enterprise is to distribute more fairly and benefit all the citizens
of China. However, state-owned enterprise is always associated with a rigid system, low
efficiency and corruption. Public opinion tends to blame state-owned enterprise for intensi-
fying corruption. I choose the employment share of state-owned enterprises as an indicator
of the prominence of state-owned enterprise in each province from 1998-2016 to explore
its effect on corruption.
2.1.3 Further Controls
Direct Investment (FDI)
Since Deng XIaoping’s reforming and opening market policy, China has introduced bil-
lions of foreign direct investment to develop the economy. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show the
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annual net amount of FDI from 1998 to 2015 in different areas of mainland China. We can
clearly see that the east coastal area (Jiangsu, Guangdong, Shanghai .etc) receives most for-
eign capital due to geographical and political factors. However, in recent years, the growth
of FDI slows due to political and economic reasons. Foreign investment not only brings
capital, but also advanced management and progressive thought. Foreign investment con-
tributes a lot to the economic growth of China, including employment and tax. A recent
report points out that the contribution of foreign companies accounts for approximately
16%-34% of GDP and 11%-29% of employment based on data from 1995 to 2013. These
two numbers are 33% and 27% respectively in 2013 alone.
Foreign investment and foreign companies should have helped to decrease corruption
and make the government more transparent. I choose sub-nation-level data of FDI per
capita over the period 1998 through to 2015 as an independent variable in the model.
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Figure 2.3: Sub-national foreign direct investment part 1
Figure 2.4: Sub-national foreign direct investment part 2
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Government Structure
Government plays an important role in modern society, especially for China’s “big govern-
ment, small society” model. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show the numbers of provincial-level local
government employees from 1998 to 2015. We can see all provinces’ government employ-
ees growing quickly in these 18 years, with certain provinces nearly doubling their employ-
ees in local government. Chinese government operates under one-party rule, and therefore
lacks competition and supervision. The government is notorious for non-transparency, low
efficiency and complexity. To manage such a big population, the government needs to re-
cruit as many civil servants as it can. According to the Ministry of Human Resource and
Social Security, the government had 7.16 million civil servants in 2015. The number is not
that big compared to the population. However, civil servants are not the only people who
need financial-support from government. It is estimated that approximately 70 million peo-
ple are financially supported within the population. This is a huge burden for government
finance. Downsizing has always been a goal for the government although the effect is not
significant. According to a recent report, the number of citizens applying for civil servant
examination has increased by 377 times in the last 24 years.
The complexity of the government structure and red tape may increase corruption
within the government. I choose the number of local government employees from 1998
to 2015 as an explanatory variable in the model.
Historical and Geographic factors
History has a big influence on modern society, especially for China, which has thousands
of years of history. Goel and Nelson (2010) argue that the history of a country helps to
shape the culture that influences acts of corruption. For example, bribery may be socially
accepted in one country while condemned by people in another country due to historical
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precedents.
Figure 2.5: Numbers of local government employee part 1
Figure 2.6: Numbers of local government employee part 2
51
This may explain why corruption is so widespread in Asia-Pacific countries. Treisman
(2000) finds that “countries with a history of British rule were robustly rated less corrupt”.
China has never truly been a colony of western powers. However, at the end of the Qing
dynasty, different parts of China were dominated by different countries, such as Germany
in Shandong province and Japan in Fujian province. I add a dummy variable in the dataset
describing whether the province was once dominated by western countries. Note that I
multiply the dummy variable with the time variable, i.e. year, in order not to drop them in
the fixed effect regression since dummies variables are time-invariant.
For the historical dummy, there were 5 western powers claiming dominant of areas at
the end of the Qing dynasty. dG denotes Germany’s dominated area which is Shandong
province; dJ denotes Japan’s dominated area which is Fujian; dF denotes France’s dom-
inated areas which are Yunnan, Guangdong, Guangxi and Hainan; dR denotes Russia’s
dominated areas which are Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, InnerMongolia and Xinjiang; dB
denotes Britain’s dominated area which is Yangtze river basin. Shanghai is a special case
since many western powers set up International Settlement in the city and this lasted until
the Japanese invaded during World War II.
Geography is also an important factor affecting corruption. Goel and Nelson (2010)
point out that larger countries are more likely to engage in corrupt activities due to ge-
ographically dispersed locations and “prisoner’s dilemma” type of situation. China is a
big country with a long coastline, there are 9 coastal provinces (Liaoning, Hebei, Shan-
dong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi and Hainan) and 2 coastal direct-
controlled municipalities (Tianjin and Shanghai). Coastal provinces are usually more de-
veloped and urbanized than in-land provinces because of the advantage of geography and
preferential policy. dC denotes coastal areas.
All variables are shown in the descriptive table below.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Table
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Corr 206 36.6165 11.97165 15 89
SOE 206 9.447772 3.978359 0.114155 21.93144
FDI 206 174.6252 211.6646 2.12 1366.13
GovStr 206 50.95243 27.933 7.1 112.8
IniGDP Pop 206 649.0152 615.915 0 2067.87
GDP 206 37.73895 21.64256 4.652 107.96
Germany Year 206 97.58738 433.0908 0 2015
Japan Year 206 58.57767 339.0227 0 2015
France Year 206 321.8981 738.8263 0 2015
Russia Year 206 292.7961 710.9159 0 2015
Britain Year 206 604.9612 924.2104 0 2015
Coast Year 206 761.0728 977.3314 0 2015
FP Year 206 1375.82 936.4144 0 2015
2.2 Empirical Model
The econometric model I use is represented as follows:
Corruptionit = β0 + β1SOEit + β2Xit + γi + it
i = 1, 2, 3, ..., 31; t = 1998, 1999, 2000, ..., 2016
In determining the causes of corruption in Mainland China, the dependent variable corruption,
denoting the level of corruption, is the number of cases prosecuted for corruption per mil-
lion people. Independent variables include the presence of state-owned enterprises (SOE)
which is measured by state-owned enterprises’ contribution to the share of total employ-
ment; X is a vector of controls including the foreign direct investment (FDI), which is
measured by the amount of foreign direct investment per capita; the government structure
(GovS tr), which is measured by the number of local government employees; (GDP) which
is measured by local GDP per capita and two dummy variables which indicate historical
factors (whether a former foreign power dominated area) and geographic factors (whether
a coastal area) respectively. The database I set up is panel. γi denotes province fixed ef-
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fects and it denotes the error term, subscript i denotes provinces in Mainland China and t
denotes the time period from 1998 to 2016.
I expect variable SOE to have a positive effect on corruption, which is consistent with
general public opinion. Citizens tend to blame state-owned enterprise for low efficiency,
corrupt, rigidity and nepotism. I think there are several reasons why state-owned enterprise
has a tight relationship with corruption in public opinion. Firstly, state-owned enterprises
are mostly a monopoly. The government forbids private investment and foreign investment
entering certain fields, such as the power sector, petroleum industry, banking system and
telecom industry. There are many famous monopoly SOEs like PetroChina, Sinopec and
ICBC (Industrial and Commercial Bank of China). These companies’ monopoly is due to
policy instead of market. Administrative monopoly breeds corruption. SOEs could rig gov-
ernment tender and have unfair competition advantage over private companies. Monopoly
SOEs increase cost and hurt the whole industry. The second consideration is SOEs’ lack
of regulation. All state-owned enterprises belong to State-owned Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission (SASAC) nominally. However, many powerful families of
high-ranked officials have huge influence on SOEs, such as a former member of the stand-
ing committee, Zhou Yongkang, who used to dominate the petroleum industry. With Zhou
Yongkang’s downfall, dozens of CEOs and senior executives in petroleum industry were
arrested for corruption. There is no third party supervising SOEs, so real profit and money
transfer are usually a black-box operation. Thirdly, SOEs are notorious for nepotism. CEOs
of state-owned enterprises tend to fill key positions with their relatives or cronies and re-
cruitment of SOEs tends to hire current employees’ offspring, particularly within the power
sector. Nepotism hurts fair competition and results in over-staffing which makes SOEs rigid
and lowers efficiency. Finally, state-owned enterprises have administrative establishment,
some being equal to department level and some to ministry level. These Chinese character-
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istics cause CEOs of state-owned enterprises to be more likely to connect with government
officials through benefit transferring.
I also expect complexity of government structure to contribute to more corruption. Goel
and Nelson (2010) argue that bigger government has greater bureaucracy and red tape and
is more likely to engage in corrupt activities. Fan et al. (2009) finds those countries with
a larger number of government or administrative employees and a larger civil service to
reported more frequent bribery. this is quite easy to understand. With a larger number
of government employees, the structure must be more complex than before, therefore it is
more difficult to regulate the whole government. The complex structure of the government
may result in internal friction and mutual excuse-making. For example, when an accident
happens, different departments are more like to blame each other instead of taking responsi-
bility. Another disadvantage is that citizens need to spare more time to process government
related stuff. People in China are always complaining that it is difficult to process govern-
ment related stuffs, such as tax paying and application for government statement. Citizens
need to endure government employees’ arrogance and red tape to get things done. Lack of
regulation is the first reason why bigger governments are more likely to engage in corrupt
activities. Chinese government, either central government or local government, is one-
party rule. The Discipline Inspection Commission (DIC) is responsible for regulation. Xi
Jingping’s ally Wang Qishan was the former secretary of the Central Discipline Inspection
Commission. The DIC contributes a great deal to fighting corruption. However, without an
independent third party, the DIC is often used as a tool to undermine political opponents
and political “witch hunt”. Nepotism is also an important reason for corruption in bigger
government. Members of the standing committee are the most powerful group of people in
China. They have a complicated interpersonal relationship. Heads of local government are
usually tightly connected with members of the standing committee. In exchange for their
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loyalty, members of the standing committee often turn a blind eye to their bribe-taking
activities or even shelter them when there is an investigation against said officials. Many
corruption cases end up with nothing because of high-ranked officials interfering. This is
an aeipathy for Chinese government. Other reasons, such as financial burden or invisible
benefit of civil servants, also contribute to intensifying corruption. For example, govern-
ment employees used to need not to pay for their pension while enjoying a larger pension
than other citizens after retirement. This policy was abolished a few years ago and the
government immediately raised employees’ pay checks.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) would decline corruption in the general opinion of the
Chinese people. Greater prosperity lowers corruption by making people, including both
citizens and civil servants, relatively rich, therefore government employees’ eagerness to
take bribes is reduced. FDI increases local employment and incomes and brings not alone
advanced management but also a democratic ethos. Democracy is an effective way to
fight corruption and although the government’s system is far from democracy, it would be
influenced by democratic sentiments to some extent. The government also needs to reform
to reduce corruption in order to appeal to foreign investors. Based on these reasons, I expect
variable FDI to have a negative effect on corruption.
Geographic factors also play a role in influencing corruption. According to a report on
provincial government, the east coastal area occupied 57.8% of total GDP in 2015. People
in coastal areas are relatively wealthier than in-land people. The east coast area is also more
urbanized than in-land areas which leads to better education and access to public services.
Wealth and education both lead to coastal area residents having more civic consciousness
and less tolerance of government misconduct. Therefore, local governments in coastal
areas are forced to behave and listen more to citizens. They also act less boldly regarding
civil issues than their in-land counterparts. I anticipate that geographic factors would result
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in less corruption.
Historical factors have always played an important role in modern China, since the
country has thousands of years of history. I choose former western power rule as the
dummy variable. I expect former rule of a western power would to reduce corruption
since these states had better legal systems and more advanced government structures than
the Qing government at that time, which would have an impact on local culture and change
it to some extent. Taking Hong Kong as an example, it is considered the least corrupt city in
the People’s Republic of China. Hong Kong had a history of more than 100 years of British
rule until 1997. British legal culture and democracy have influenced Hong Kong deeply,
which makes the city one of the least corrupt areas in the world. Shanghai is another good
example, with former rule by different western powers simultaneously. It has now become
one of the most advanced cities in China and is believed to be one of the least corrupt cities.
2.3 Empirical Results
Table 2.2 shows the result of ordinary least squares (OLS) fixed effect regression and table
2.3 shows the result of the same regression without province fixed effect as a check on
robustness. We can clearly see that without province fixed effect, the standard error of
dummy variables in table 2.3 is much larger than that in table 2.2 which means the data is
more spread out from the mean value without province fixed effect. Therefore, the data of
dummy variables performs better with province fixed effect.
In the first column of table 2.2, I only include variable SOE and GDP in my model,
we can see the coefficient of SOE is negative. In the second column, I add variable FDI
in the regression and the coefficient of SOE is negative as well. In the third column, I add
variable GovS tr in the regression, the coefficient of SOE is still negative. However, in the
fourth and fifth column, I add historical and geographic dummies in the regression, the co-
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efficient of SOE is positive, which is inconsistent with the results of the first three columns
regarding the coefficient of SOE. The inconsistency of the results may potentially be due
to the endogeneity of SOE. Many factors may cause endogeneity, such as omitted variable
bias, measurement error in independent variables and simultaneous causality. In our case,
reverse causality may be an issue. However, reverse causality occurs when the causality
runs in both direction which means dependent variable (Corr) affects independent variable
(SOE) and vice versa. For instance, more corrupt officials and bureaucrats may push the
agenda, which requires establishment of more state-owned enterprise locally, in order to
embezzle for personal gain. Therefore, regions featuring more corruption may progres-
sively grow a larger public sector as public employment is used as a reward in patron-client
relationships. When there is reverse causality, the independent variable is correlated with
the error term and OLS estimation picks up both forwards and backwards effect which re-
sults in bias and inconsistent coefficients. To address the problem of endogeneity, we use
two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression.
First we need to find a valid instrumental variable which is uncorrelated with the error
term and be relevant for the enodogenous variable. In our case, a suitable instrument candi-
date for state-owned enterprises is a variable that is correlated with state-owned enterprises
but does not directly affect corruption. Relying on Chinese recent history, I identified a
suitable instrument. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded in 1949. As a
communist country, it was deeply influenced by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR). The government tried to set up a series of state-owned enterprises to achieve pub-
lic ownership of production materials. When choosing the location for these state-owned
enterprises, the government’s mainly consideration is to boost local economy through the
set-up of state-owned enterprises since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was founded
to help the poor and eliminate the inequality. Therefore, the government transfers capital
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and human resources from relatively more advanced provinces to relatively depressed areas
to set up state-owned enterprises to foster local development. GDP is the best indicator re-
flecting local economy thus I collect data of sub-national GDP of 5 years in total from 1950
to 1954, which is correlate with the initial set-up of state-owned enterprises. To capture the
dynamic of today’s change, I combine it with the local population figures from 1998 to
2016. The variable IniGDP Pop in table 2.1 denotes the instrument variable I choose.
Now we run the two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression. Tables 2.4 and 2.5 show
the results of first and second stage of two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression. Note
that in column 6 I merge the five historical dummies into one dummy variable FP Year
trying to improve the efficiency of the estimation by reducing the number of variables
although. In table 2.4 ,we can see that the correlation between independent variable SOE
and instrumental variable IniGDP Pop is negative in all 6 columns. In table 2.5, we see the
coefficient of SOE in all 5 columns is positive and consistent. Although only coefficients
in the first three columns are statistical significance casting some doubts on the results,
overall the results in Table 2.5 suggest that state-owned enterprises have a positive effect
on corruption. Taking column 6 as an example, a standard deviation increase in SOE
increases corruption by 250%.
As for other controls, in column 6, a standard deviation increase in FDI decreases
corruption by 1.86% which is consistent with previous expectation; a standard deviation
increase in GovS tr increases corruption by 8.12% which is also consistent with previous
expectation. However, geographic dummy Coast Yeat increase the level of corruption in
both column 5 and column 6 which is contrary to the previous expectation. This is because
the Chinese government is a centralized system hence local government has less autonomy
in terms of law and executive. The central government is relatively corrupt which also
influences local government whether in-land or coastal. The merged historical dummy
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Table 2.2: OLS Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES SOE SOE SOE SOE SOE SOE
SOE -0.393 -0.754** -0.768* 0.137 0.183 -1.211***
(0.368) (0.379) (0.401) (0.459) (0.450) (0.429)
FDI -0.0331*** -0.0329*** -0.0282*** -0.0228*** -0.0314***
(0.00767) (0.00792) (0.00778) (0.00783) (0.00809)
GovStr 0.0194 0.121 0.0951 0.0619
(0.168) (0.155) (0.151) (0.165)
Germany Year -1.094* -0.349
(0.592) (0.633)
Japan Year -0.402 0.363
(0.777) (0.804)
France Year 0.403 1.162***
(0.323) (0.410)
Russia Year 2.603*** 2.414***
(0.444) (0.439)
Britain Year -0.575** -0.481*
(0.263) (0.260)
Coast Year -0.999*** -1.052***
(0.342) (0.285)
FP Year 0.229
(0.267)
GDP 0.137*** 0.255*** 0.247*** 0.233*** 0.290*** 0.282***
(0.0393) (0.0466) (0.0805) (0.0865) (0.0868) (0.0854)
Constant 35.34*** 39.90*** 39.30*** -388.1 6.547 526.1
(4.552) (4.701) (7.027) (332.7) (352.5) (355.7)
Observations 206 206 206 206 206 206
R-squared 0.130 0.216 0.216 0.421 0.449 0.2747
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 2.3: OLS Regression without Province Fixed Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES SOE SOE SOE SOE SOE SOE
SOE 0.679*** 0.730*** 0.491** -0.126*** -1.268*** 0.419*
(0.203) (0.201) (0.230) (0.251) (0.252) (0.237)
FDI -0.0214*** -0.0248*** -0.0240*** -0.0263*** -0.0200***
(0.00562) (0.00579) (0.00455) (0.00538) (0.00641)
GovStr -0.0717*** -0.155*** -0.156*** -0.0675*
(0.0341) (0.0312) (0.0313) (0.0343)
Germany -4.164 -5.778
(3.308) (3.873)
Japan -8.393*** -9.932**
(4.101) (4.529)
France -10.32*** -11.58***
(1.961) (2.511)
Russia 16.28*** 16.07***
(2.068) (2.085)
Britain -11.72*** -12.18***
(1.864) (1.953)
Coast 1.676 -3.821*
(2.086) (2.087)
FP 0.224
(1.943)
GDP 0.0225 0.175*** 0.209*** 0.174*** 0.175*** 0.205***
(0.0372) (0.0547) (0.0567) (0.0451) (0.0451) (0.0565)
Constant 29.65*** 26.87*** 32.06*** 57.30*** 57.65*** 33.13***
(2.496) (2.560) (3.541) (4.004) (4.032) (4.056)
Observations 206 206 206 206 206 206
R-squared 0.052 0.111 0.131 0.486 0.488 0.147
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 2.4: First Stage Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES SOE SOE SOE SOE SOE SOE
IniGDP Pop -0.00438*** -0.00446*** -0.00319*** -0.00157 -0.00344*** -0.00188*
(0.000478) (0.000478) (0.00102) (0.000972) (0.00112) (0.00111)
FDI 0.00970*** 0.00805*** 0.00747*** 0.00435* 0.00487*
(0.00246) (0.00273) (0.00239) (0.00254) (0.00280)
GovStr -0.0344 -0.0686*** -0.0325 -0.0602***
(0.0245) (0.0217) (0.0241) (0.0253)
Germany Year 0.000109 -0.000800
(0.000728) (0.000770)
Japan Year -0.00384*** -0.00508***
(0.000605) (0.000707)
France Year -0.00200*** -0.00287***
(0.000380) (0.000459)
Russia Year 0.000559 0.000550
(0.000394) (0.000389)
Britain Year -0.00285*** -0.00299***
(0.000333) (0.000331)
Coast Year 0.00149*** 0.000283
(0.000455) (0.000388)
FP Year -0.00190***
(0.000322)
GDP -0.0251* -0.0819*** -0.0677*** -0.0726*** -0.0780*** -0.0545**
(0.0136) (0.0204) (0.0227) (0.0199) (0.0197) (0.0219)
Constant 14.35*** 14.78*** 15.41*** 18.66*** 18.14*** 18.21***
(0.548) (0.553) (0.709) (0.749) (0.756) (0.837)
Observations 381 381 381 381 381 381
R-squared 0.187 0.225 0.229 0.443 0.459 0.298
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 2.5: Second Stage Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Corr Corr Corr Corr Corr
SOE 1.566*** 1.593*** 4.446** 3.490 3.666 2.507
(0.427) (0.411) (2.247) (5.131) (3.714) (4.407)
FDI -0.0242*** -0.0190** -0.0191* -0.0186**
(0.00592) (0.00920) (0.0105) (0.00804)
GovStr 0.239 0.173 0.185 0.0812
(0.166) (0.356) (0.260) (0.316)
Germany Year 0.000811 -0.000875
(0.00302) (0.00356)
Japan Year 0.0105 0.0109
(0.0161) (0.0124)
France Year -0.00101 -0.000941
(0.00472) (0.00416)
Russia Year 0.00170 0.00144
(0.00710) (0.00520)
Britain Year 0.00364 0.00397
(0.0103) (0.00767)
Coast Year 0.000115 0.00133
(0.0182) (0.0170)
FP Year 0.00183
(0.0378)
GDP 0.0203 0.190*** -0.0270 0.106 0.103 0.164
(0.0385) (0.0570) (0.0656) (0.104) (0.0929) (0.110)
Constant 21.40*** 18.60*** -16.11 -8.743 -11.16 4.347
(4.322) (4.308) (28.25) (71.36) (51.87) (60.79)
Observations 206 206 206 206 206 206
R-squared 0.030
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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FPYear has a positive effect on corruption while different foreign power has mixed effect
on corruption in the first 5 columns. This is because the duration of western powers rule is
different. For example, Britain ruled Hong Kong for more than 100 years while Germany
ruled Shandong province only till World War I. Some influence may last, some may vanish
relatively quickly.
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter studies the impact of state-owned enterprises on the level of corruption in
mainland China. My analysis shows that state-owned enterprises would increase the level
of corruption due to bribery, nepotism and other reasons. This is consistent with the public
opinion that state-owned enterprises are deeply corrupt and have negative impact on the
society.
To enrich these arguments, I include in my model a set of controls suggested in the
reviewed literature and find some results in line with the general findings. In particular,
I find foreign capital stock (denoted by foreign direct investment) would decrease corrup-
tion, while the complex structure of government (denoted by numbers of local government
employee) would increase corruption. I also add two dummy variables denoting historical
and geographic factors. I find that location in coastal areas would also increase corruption.
I use the former rule of Western powers at the end of the Qing dynasty as a historical factor
and find that it has a mixed effect on corruption.
Due to endogeneity, I find an instrumental variable for state-owned enterprises and run
the two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression. Although my 2SLS results suggest that state-
owned enterprise increases local corruption, the lack of robustness and the nature of data
used to measure corruption warns against easy generalizations. More analysis and better
data are needed to credibly establish a causal relationship between state-owned enterprises
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and corruption.
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Conclusion
In the first chapter, we study the distribution of wealth using a representative consumer
model with endogenous labour supply. We also adopt two heterogeneities: tastes and initial
wealth. We find that in regard to the cross section of labour supply, there is no dynamic.
We also find that how the wealthy and the poor tend to change their condition in the cross
section of consumption and wealth during different business cycles. In the last part of the
first chapter, we apply the representative consumer theory to the Ramsey growth model to
derive distribution predictions.
In the second chapter, we mainly focus on the impact of state-owned enterprise on
the level of corruption. We also include several controls suggested by the literature under
review. We find that state-owned enterprises do increase the level of corruption, which is
consistent with general opinion. We also find that openness to trade reduces corruption
and the complex of the structure of government increases corruption. As for the coastal
geography dummy, it surprisingly increases corruption. Historical dummies have a mixed
effect on corruption.
I hope my findings will help policy makers to reduce income inequality and better fight
corruption in government.
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